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The Right to Party, en Masse 
August 13, 2008 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 3 comments 
By Haiyan Lee 
The most clichéd way of referring to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in English-language media has 
been “China’s coming-out party.” The slightly condescending undertone is nonetheless mingled with 
well-wishing that the debutante will give the world a heck of a party, the glitches and disappointments 
in the run-up notwithstanding. For this precious moment, China chose Zhang Yimou, arguably its most 
talented film director, to chaperone itself onto the world stage. 
 
By all indications, it was a good choice. The 50-minute multi-million-dollar extravaganza was so 
spectacular that the only appropriate response, it would seem, was a WOW! Or to wonder, like one 
American volleyball player did, “How did they do that?” Any more parsing would seem pedantic. But, 
alas, this is the age of “have computer, will blog.” So let’s begin with the New York Times piecethat 
hails the event as a wild success with “signature Chinese touches.” There is no denying that the lavish 
ceremony was first and foremost about China. And the China it celebrated was ancient (the 5000-year 
history), civilized (the arts and crafts), inventive (the four great inventions), adventurous (the silk 
roads), hospitable (the Confucian chant about cherishing guests from afar), technologically 
accomplished (the astronaut), and innocent and hopeful (the school children). It wore love, peace, 
and harmony proudly on its sleeve. What more could the world ask for? 
Dutiful commentators will likely remind us what this dazzling propaganda blockbuster conceals: the 
human rights abuses, the suppression of ethnic/regional autonomy, the rise of xenophobic 
nationalism, the environmental degradation, the widening gap between rich and poor, the unholy 
alliances with authoritarian regimes elsewhere, and so on. However, not every skeleton has been 
stuffed into the national closet. In fact, the ceremony openly paraded the specter of another China 
that should in theory jar the domestic revelers and besotted observers alike: Mao’s China. 
Everything about the Beijing Olympics was meant to sweep you off your feet. But above all, it was the 
number of performers—15,000—in the opening ceremony that probably caused many an eye to pop 
and jaw to drop. Given how much of the “Chineseness” in the program belonged to the category of 
“invented” or at least airbrushed tradition, the surreally synchronized movements of thousands of 
people was perhaps the most “signature” of the Chinese touches. The antecedents are much closer in 
history and more vivid in memory: we need only recall the images of mass formations dressed in 
regulation garb, chanting in unison, marching in lockstep, waving the little red book, or doing what 
George Orwell calls “physical jerks.” To date, only the North Koreans can rival the Chinese in staging 
such spectacles of sheer numbers. It is the totalitarian aesthetic at its most beguiling and frightening. 
It is the power of ritual. 
 
A new book called Ritual and Its Consequences argues that ritual is a quintessential human activity 
because it creates an “as if” world in which identities are made, boundaries tested, and human 
potentialities stretched. It can be used by rulers to solidify the existing order, or by the malcontent to 
imagine alternative worlds. The Chinese Communist Party, since its days of fighting guerrilla warfare 
in the countryside, has tapped the powers of ritual with consummate skill: it famously invented the 
ritual of fanshen (turning over) to denounce the ancien regime and the social order it presided over; 
and it mandated (and to some extent still does) mass participation in a numbing array of state-
orchestrated rituals (such as mass rallies) to cultivate loyalty and conformity. 
The Party understands well the transformative power of ritual: it can goad a timid peasant to point an 
accusing finger at a local despot, inspire saintly acts of self-sacrifice in an ordinary person, or make 
schoolgirls savagely beat their teacher to death. Zhang Yimou, too, has understood this well since his 
days as a cinematographer. The 1980s classic, Yellow Earth (directed by Chen Kaige, with Zhang as 
cinematographer), already gives us a good taste of Zhang’s passion for mass rituals leavened with 
bold colors and primal music. In a brief but powerful scene set in Yan’an, the Party’s headquarters 
during the war of resistance against Japan, a large assembly of men in peasant jackets and white 
turbans dance to the stirring beat of waist-drums, kicking up clouds of dust and a delirious 
atmosphere of festivity. They are sending off new Red Army recruits who file past with red ribbons 
tied across their torsos—after the bridegroom’s fashion at rural weddings. The scene is a potent 
reminder that it was the Party’s ability to absorb folk arts and rituals into its political theater, as much 
as its Marxist-Leninist ideology and military know how, that enabled it to sweep into power in 1949. 
To be sure, the film ends on a subversive note of skepticism, showing a huge gathering of peasants 
prostrating on the parched yellow earth in a rain-seeking ritual and then surging forth in a 
direction away from the far horizon where the protagonist and communist soldier Gu Qing reappears 
after a period of absence. The ending suggests that the Party saves neither the girl (Cuiqiao) from the 
fate of arranged marriage, nor the peasants in general from the blight of poverty and ignorance. Such 
discordant moments, however, are rare in Zhang’s later, martial arts epics. Beginning with Hero, 
Zhang seems enthralled by what Susan Sontag calls “fascinatin’ fascism,” or power dressed up as 
splendid spectacles. Repeatedly, he knocks us dead with glorious mise-en-scènes of ancient humanity, 
surprisingly agile in their quaintly cumbersome accoutrements not unlike those worn by portions of 
the opening ceremony performers, carrying out the will of a tyrant with unstoppable menace. These 
are the films that have at last turned a profit for Zhang and endeared him to the authorities. They are 
seductive in the same way that films about the Nazi aesthetics of pomp and violence have perversely 
held audiences’ attention worldwide for decades. 
 
It is no accident that a New York Times profile of Zhang Yimou calls him China’s Leni Riefenstahl. 
Whether or not the analogy is fair, Zhang’s success owes as much to an iron-fisted regime that loves 
grandeur as to our irrepressible fascination with aestheticized and ritualized politics, particularly its 
ability to galvanize people to achieve the seemingly impossible. In comparison, democratic politics 
(unless it resorts to imperialist, shock’n’awe-style violence against a “rogue” nation) is hopelessly drab 
and tedious—how on earth does one turn C-Span into a visually stunning and emotionally arousing 
spectacle? The same book on ritual mentioned earlier asserts that modern western societies cling to 
the virtue of sincerity and authenticity out of a profound distrust of ritual. Ritual appears to many as 
empty formality devoid of genuine feeling. But this doesn’t mean that we are immune to its allures of 
creativity, theatricality, and communality, or its promise to lift us out of our private, atomized 
existence. 
Somewhat reassuringly, China has chosen a sporting event, rather than war or conquest, as its rite of 
passage, transposing its mass rituals from Tiananmen Square to the National Stadium, affectionately 
known as the Bird’s Nest. Sports, along with cinema, pretty much remains the only legitimate domain 
where our appetite for grand spectacle can be safely satisfied. Hence the nearly universal insistence 
that the Olympics is not about politics and should not be politicized. But as the organizers and would-
be protesters are well aware, ritual takes us to an “as if” world where there are as many dreams as 
there are people and where the joust to control meaning is nothing if not political. 
 
So is not the motto for the Beijing Olympics, “One world, one dream,” a tad naive? It’s a beautiful 
ideal, but it ill prepares one for the inconvenient fact of human plurality and the inevitable clashes of 
desires and interests. Might not “Many dreams, a single planet” better serve China as well as the rest 
of the world? 
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